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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----------oOo---------TERRY LYNNE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
WILLIAM K. HINKLE and
KATHRYN P. HINKLE,
Defendants-Respondents.
----------oOo----------

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This in an action by Plaintiff-Appellant (hereinafter
referred to as "Plaintiff") for specific performance allegedly due from Defendant-Respondents (hereinafter referred to
as "Defendants") under a Uniform Real Estate Contract and
for damages allegedly incurred as a result of the failure of
Defendants to perform thereunder.

The action also involves

a Counterclaim by Defendants for attorney's fees incurred in
defense of the performance sought by Plaintiff.

DISPOSITION IN LmlER COURT
This matter was heard by the Court upon
summary Judgment filed by both parties.

~lotions

for

From an Order of the
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Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Christine

~1.

Durham presiding, dismissing the

complaint of Plaintiff with prejudice anct awarding Defendants the sum of $500.00 as attorney's fees,

upon their

counterclaim, Plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek to have the Judgment of the Trial Court
affirmed and to have this Court award Defendants additional
attorney's fees for defending this matter on appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is very thorough.

A

correction should be made, however, at page 6 of Plaintiff's
Brief, in the second full paragraph, in what would appear to
be a mere typographical error.

The record, including page

45 of the transcript, clearly indicates that the rate of
interest Plaintiff paid Defendants under the contract was
more, not "less", than the rate paid by Defendants to Deseret
Federal.

In addition, it should be noted that the counsel

for the parties stipulated before the Court that $500.00
would be reasonable attorney's fees for the services rendered
up to the time of the Judgment.

- 2 -

[Tr. 60)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court erred in granting
Summary Judgment in this matter since other evidence may
have been adduced at trial to ascertain the meaning and
intent of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Plaintiff

relies on the general principle set forth by this Court in
Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98, 306
P.2d 773 (1957), for the proposition that the Court should
have looked to the four corners of the instrument, other
contemporaneous writings and extrinsic parole evidence of
their intentions, before concluding the meaning of the
contract and, more specifically, the paragraphs under consideration.
Plaintiff misinterprets the Court's statement in Continental, however.

It was merely setting forth the Order in

which the Court should look of various items.

It does not

change the general rule that the Court will not look to any
contemporaneous writings or other evidence to interpret a
contract unless the meaning cannot be ascertained from the
contract itself.

The Court in Continental, supra., specifi-

cally explained this concept, immediately following the
quotation cited at page 11 of Plaintiff's Brief:
If the ambiguity can be reconciled from
a reasonable interpretation of the
instrument, extrinsic evidence should
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
not Library
be Services
allowed.
(Citing
cases)
and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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This general rule was expressed as grounds for revising
the Judgment of the Trial Court in E.A. Strout Western Realli
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1974), whereir
the Court explained:
Parole evidence may be received to clarify
ambiguous language in a contract, to show
what the agreement was related to filling
in blanks and to supply omitted terms which
were agreed upon but inadvertenty left out
of the written agreement.
However, under
the general rule, which is applicable here,
parole evidence may not be qiven to change
the terms of a written agreement which are
clear, definite, and unambiguous. (522 P.2d
at 145)
Again, in Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah, 1979),
cited at pp. 9-11 of Plaintiff's Brief, the Court noted:
Deeds are to be construed like other
vnitten instruments, and where a deed
is plain and unambiguous, parol evidence
is not admissible to vary its terms.
It
is the court's duty to construe a deed as
it is written, and in the final analysis,
each instrument must be construed in the
light of its own language and peculiar facts.
It is also well know that the intention of
the parties to a conveyance is open to interpretation only when the words used are anbiguous. (596 P.2d at 656)

To the same effect, see Cornwall v. Hillow Creek Country Club
13 U.2d 160, 369 P.2d 928 (1962); Mark Steel Corporation v.
Eimco Corporation, 548 P.2d 892

(Utah, 1976); and Jaye Smith

Construction v. Board of Education, Granite School District,
560 P.2d 320 (Utah, 1977); and Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm,
P.2d 690

(Utah, 1977).
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The Plaintiff further misinterprets what this court has
determined to constitute an ambiguity.

Plaintiff contends

that the contract must be ambiguous since:
It is Plaintiff's position that the
contract means what it says. It is
apparently Defendants' position that
the contract means something else.
Although neither party has claimed
that the contract is ambiguous, the
respective positions of the parties
imply that the Court need interpret
the contract. (Plaintiff's Brief p. 11)
However, a contractual term is not ambiguous merely
because the two parties interpret it differently.

This

Court, in Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Association, 589
P.2d 780 (Utah, 1979), examined the meaning of a provision
of an insurance policy term, "medical equipment", which
Plaintiff contended included a specially equipped van and
which the insurance company claimed did not include such a
van.

The Court held that there was no ambiguity to construe

against the drafter of the agreement, explaining:
Nor can we say the policy provision
quoted above is ambiguous. A term is
not necessarily ambiguous simply
because one party seeks to endow it
with a different meaning from that
relied on by the drafter.
(589
P.2d at 782)
Further, in the case at bar, the ambiguity claimed by
Plaintiff to exist in the contract was between the language
of paragraph 8 of the standard printed language of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract and the language added

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
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by the parties in paragraph 3 of that Contract, which stated
that the contract balance of $40,000 was to be paid:
Three hundred thirteen dollars and sixty
cents or more on or before the 12th day of
June and Three hundred thirteen dollars
and sixty cents on or before the 12th day
of each month thereafter until contract
balance is paid in full, together with all
interest accrued and in addition Buyer
to make one balloon payment in the amount
of $8,163.22 (Eight thousand one hundred
sixty-three and twenty-two cents) on or
before May 12, 1978. Said payment to
include 1/12 of property taxes and 1/12 cf
hazard insurance monthly.
If taxes and
insurance increase, monthly payments to be
adjusted accordingly. The buyers shall pay
interest on the balloon payment of 9-1/2
interest until paid in full.
(Emphasis
added)
( Tr. 13)
clearly, the foregoing language contemplated a continuing
contract with the Respondents until the $40,000 balance was
paid in full.

This language cannot be made amhiguous by

other terms of the agreement since, in the event of such
potential ambiguity, the terms added to the printed contract
hy the parties would govern.

Ser>

l'ollanrl v. Er01:n, 1': P.21

422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964) and Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559
P.2d 538 (Utah, 1977).
In accordance with the foregoing, it is generally held
that the interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for
the Court to decide,

justifying Summary Judgment.

In Overson

v. United Sates Fidelity and Guaranty, 587 P.2d 149 (Utah,
1978), this concept was emphasized in denying an appeal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
- may
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Machine-generated OCR,
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from a directed verdict for the defendant, wherein the
appellant claimed the insurance policy was ambiguous.

The

court explained:
All of these facts being undisputed,
there is no genuine issue of fact to
be resolved. The accepted principle
is that the interpretation of a contract's language is usually a law
matter.
This principle was articulated
in the case of Central Credit Collection
Corp. v. Grayson as follows:
'Interpretation of a written contract is
usually a question of law for the court.
If its terms are clear and unambiguous,
summary judgment is proper. Even
where some ambiguity exists in the
contract, resolution of the ambiguity
is still a question of law for the
court, unless contradictory evidence
is presented to clarify the ambiguity.'
Therefore, because there is no dispute
as to material fact the court could
properly have granted USF & G's motion
for summary judgment. (587 P.2d at 151)
See also Pacific States Lost Iron Pike Co. v. Harsh Utah
Corporation, 5 U.2d 244, 300 P.2d 610 (1956), cited by the
Court in support of Overson, supra.
Based upon all of the foregoing, Respondents respectfully submit that the Trial Court properly determined that
the contract, as a matter of law, precluded the relief
sought by Plaintiff and, therefore, properly granted
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing
Plaintiff's Complaint, with prejudice.

7 - provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AvlARDED
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANTS FOR
THE DEFENSE OF THIS ACTION
The general rule in Utah is clearly that, in the absence
of a contractual provision or statute, attorney's fees are
not recoverable, unless eguity permits otherwise.

See ~

Homes v. Greater Park City, 529 P.2d 620 (Utah, 1979)'
B & R SUEElY Co. v.

1216 ( 1972)
(1966).

i

Bringhurst, 28 U.2d 44 2, 503 P.2d

and Blake v. Blake, 17 u. 2d 369, 412 P.26 4 5~

However, in the case at bar, attorney's fees are

provided for in the contract at issue.

That contract (a

Uniform Real Estate Contract) provides, at paragraph 2:
The Buyer and Seller each agree that should
they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting
party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which
may arise or accrue from enforcing this
agreement, or in obtaining possession of
the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing
any remedy provided hereunder or by the
statutes of the State of Utah whether such
remeGy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise.
(Tr. 14)
Based upon that provision and the other provisions of
that contract, the Trial Court reasonably and properly
concluded that this was a type of situation reasonably
within the contemplation of the parties, where attorney's
fees would be incurred and awarded as part of the Court's
Judgment.

The reasonableness of the amount of that award

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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($500.00) was stipulated to by counsel (Tr. 60) and is not
being challenged by Plaintiff in this Appeal.
Furthermore, this Court in Swain v. Salt Lake Real
Estate and Investment Company, 3 U.2d 121, 279 P.2d 709
(1955) held that a substantially similar matter justified
the award of attorney's fees under the identical provision
of another Uniform Real Estate Contract.

There, the vendor

brought an action to declare a forfeiture of the contract.
The Trial Court rendered Judgment for the defendant purchaser,
but denied attorney's fees on the basis that there had been
no default and paragraph 21 applied only to situations where
one of the parties defaulted in one of the covenants or
agreements contained in the contract.

The Court, in modifying

the lower Court's Judgment to include $250.00 attorney's
fees, explained that this was an action for "enforcing the
agreement" and, therefore, within the meaning and intent of
paragraph 21.

The Court explained:

The contract provides that 'The Buyer
and Seller each agree that should they
default in any of the covenants and
agreements contained herein, to pay all
costs and expenses that may arise from
enforcing this agreement, either by suit
or otherwise, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.'
It was held in the case
of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P.206,
under a similar provision, that the vendor
could not claim attorney's fees in an unlawful
detainer action after declaration of forfeiture.
The court reasoned that such an action was
-

9 -
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not one for 'enforcing the agreement' but
rather one outside the contract.
Such is not
the present case, for while the seller
sought to forfeit the contract, the buyer
maintained his rights under the contract
and incurred costs in enforcing the agreement.
The parties contracted to pay such
costs and stipulated that $250 would be
reasonable.
In short, this Court logically concluded that

enforcement~

a contract necessarily includes defenses from such enforcement.
SiMilarly, in the case at bar, the Plaintiff eEcic":;vnre0
to force Defendants to transfer the property, subject to the
existing mortgage thereon, and to allow Defendants to assume
that existing Mortgage, allegedly in accordance with the
provisions of the contract.

Defendants defended against

such a transfer on the basis that their rights under that
contract were to receive certain monies from Plaintiff until
the balance of the amounts due uncer the contract had been
received.

Defendants were, therefore, maintaining their

rights under the contract and thereby incurred the at~orney'o
fees in question, as contemplated in paragraph 21 of the
Contract, in enforcing the agreement.

(Tr. 14)

Defendants submit that they were entitled to the at torney's fees awarded by the Trial Court and that the Trial
Court properly awarded the same as part of its Judgment
dismissing Plaintiff's CoMplaint.

- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO BE AvlARDED
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THIS APPEAL
Similarly to Point II, Defendants respectfully submit
that they should be awarded the attorney's fees reasonably
incurred in the defense of this Appeal, which reasonable
amount Defendants claim to be $750.00.
The general rule in such matter is set forth in an
excellent annotation at 52 A.L.R.2d 862, wherein thr authors
note:
In cases in which a contractual provision
for attorneys' fees existed in favor of
a particular party, and such party was
successful in the trial court but was
required to defend against an unsuccessful appeal of the losing party, additional
attorneys' fees have been allowed for the
appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to address this
issue in several cases and has indicated that the award of
such fees on appeal are within the discretion of this Court.
In Swain, supra., this Court refused to allow attorney's
fees on appeal under the particular circumstances of that
case, but indicated that in a proper case, such fees would
be allowed.

The Court stated:

Since it appears probable that after the
issues were drawn, the only real contest
below was that concerning the award of
an attorney's fee, we are of the opinion
that the stipulated amount of such fee
should cover services rendered in the
court below and on appeal. Attorney's
fees on appeal are discretionary with
this court and, under the facts of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, -administered by the Utah State Library.
- 11
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case, we are of the persuasion that no
additional fee should be allowed.
(279
P.2d at 711)
In Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah, 1976), this Court
confronted the issue of additional attorney's fees on

appe~

and, apparently due to the fact that the matter at issue

~~

a divorce and both parties had appealed, the majority of the
Court held that the matter should be remanded for a
ation of

~1hat

determi~

amount, if any, should be awarded as additional

attorney's fees for the appeal.

Former Chief Justice Ellett,

with the concurrence of Justice Maughan, concurred with the
majority opinion, indicating that their differences were
over which Court should determine the issue of additional
attorney's fees on appeal.

Justice Ellett explained:

I concur except as to the remanding of
this case to permit the trial court to
determine whether attorney's fees should
be awarded on appeal.
The awarding of attorney's fees on
appeal is a matter entirely within
discretion of the appellate court.
See Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate
and Investment Company, 3 Utah 2d
121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); and 5 Am
Jur.2d Appeal and Error, Sec. 1022.
(558 P.2d at 516)
\'1hile the specific fact situation in Eastman, supra.
reguired, in the opinion of a majority of the Court, a

dete~

mination of the Trial Court as to what amount of additional
attorney's fees should be awarded for the appeal, it clearly

- 12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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establishes that additional attorney's fees should be awarded
for the defense of an appeal, at least where an appropriate
basis for the attorney's fees on the initial trial exists.
On a matter such as that in the case at bar, the award of
attorney's fees is required if the intention of the parties
is to be carried out and the seller (Defendants) are to
receive the full amount of the debt without deduction for
legal expenses.
An excellent summary of this rationale is found in
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91 Idaho 544, 428 P.2d 50 (1967),
wherein the Court explained:
Plaintiff by motion duly served and
filed herein, seeks additional attorneys
fees in defending this appeal. The
promissory note provides for reasonable
attorneys' fees in the event suit be
brought to enforce the note. The purpose of such a contractual provision in
the note 'is to indemnify the creditor
against the necessity of paying an
attorney's fee * * * and to enable him
to recover the full amount of his debt
without deduction for legal expenses.'
Hahn v. Hahn, 124 Cal.App.2d 97, 103,
266 P.2d 519, 523 (1954). Although
several jurisdictions have held in
similar situations that attorneys'
fees should not be allowed for
successfully defending an appeal on
various grounds, i.e., that the contract was merged in the judgment or
that the fees were not within the
contemplation of the parties (See:
Annot.: 52 A.L.R.2d 863 at 871), the
more recent and in our opinion the
better reasoned cases allow such fees
on appeal.
It is our conclusion that
the plaintiff is entitled to fees for
the services of her attorneys in
defending this appeal. Otherwise, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amount of her recovery on the defendant's
contractual obligation would be reduced
contrary to the purpose of the contractual
provision for payment of attorneys' fees
in the event of suit brought to enforce
the note.
Steele v. Vanderslice, 90
Ariz. 277, 367 P.2d 636 (1961); Anderson
v. Hiatt, 181 Cal.App.2d 9, 4 Cal.Rptr.
858 (Cal.App.1960). Hahn v. Hahn, 123
Cal.App.2d 97, 266 P.2d 519 (Cal.App.1954);
Puget Sound Mutual Savings Bank v. Lillions, 50 Wash.2d 799, 314 P.2d 935 (1957).
Ciriffiele v. Shinazy, 134 Cal.App.2d SO,
285 P.2d 311, 52 A.L.R.2d 860 (Cal.App.
1955). Annat: 52 A.L.R.2d 863; 17 Am.
Jur.2d Contracts §292, p. 708.
similarly, in the case at bar, the contract provided
for such

inde~nification

against legal and other expenses

resulting from the enforcement of the contract and, therefore,
it is not unreasonable for the Defendants to

regues~

the

award of attorney's fees for the defense of this appeal.
It is respectfully submitted that an attorney's fee of
$750.00 is an extremely reasonable fee for such an appeal in

view of the amount of time necessarily involved in preparatior
of a Supreme Court Brief and arguing a matter such as this
to this Court.

Defendants respectfully submit, therefore,

that an additional award of $750.00 attorney's fees should
be made to Defendants as part of the Order of this Court
affirming the decision of the Trial Court.

CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully submit that the Trial Court's
action in this matter was fully in accord vlith the principals
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
- 14by the
- Utah State Library.
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enunciated by this Court in earlier matters and should be
affirmed.

The Contract in this matter, as a

~atter

of law,

simply did not create any right on the part of the Plaintiff
to the relief sought from that Court.

Since substantial

attorney's fees were incurred in the defense of the Plaintiff's
unfounded claim, the Court properly awarded Defendants
Judgment upon their Counterclaim for the reasonable amount
of such fees, so that Defendants would still receive the
full amount of the debt, as agreed to under that Contract.
For the same reason, it is respectfully submitted, this
Court should award Defendants an additional $750.00 as
attorney's fees on this Appeal, pursuant to paragraph 21 of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Respectfully submitted this

(Tr. 14)

~~of

October,

1979.
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS

c

By

------;r-

.--z -~"'
DEAN
GA!1Y • ATKIN
Att: rneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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